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1- INTRODUCTION 1 
"1 am very much aware that many economists whom 1respect and admire will not agree with the 
opinions 1have expressed and some may even be offended by them. But a scholar must be content 
with the knowledge that what is false in what he says will soon be exposed and, as for what is 
troe, he can collOt on ultimately seeing it accepted, if on1y he lives long enough." Ronald Coase, 
The Institutional Structure 01 Production, 1991 Nobel Lecture in Economic Sciences. 
There is no doubt that liquidity and informational efficiency, among others, are important characterístics 
of a securities market. However, it is c1ear that these characteristics are not, or should not be, ends in themselves. 
There seems to be little doubt that, from a normative point of view, the ultimate goal (hence, the ultimate concem 
of policy makers) is (or should be) to maximize social welfare. 
The literature on speculative trading under asymmetric information has focussed its attention on the analysis 
of market liquidity and informational efficiency,2 but has paid relatively little attention to the issue of insider trading 
and its regulation. 3 Those studies that do consider insider trading, on the other hand, have usually omitted welfare 
analyses. To the best of my knowledge, only Ausubel (1990) and Leland (1992) have addressed the crítical question: 
Does imider trading regulation (ITR) make society better off or worse off? Note that this question does not focus 
on the effects of ITR on liquidity, informational efficiency. or other characteristics of a securities market; rather, 
it focusses on the impact of ITR on social welfare. Further, it does not focus on the welfare of a given type of 
agents; rather, it focusses on the welfare of society as a whole. 
Ausubel (1990) considers the impact of ITR on social welfare within the framework of a competitive market 
and conc1udes that society is better off when insider trading is restricted. However, his analysis neglects a fact that 
has become widely accepted: if expectations are rational, a trader with prívate information is never smal1.4 Hence, 
1 1would like to thaok. Joe Finneny, Jennie France, Mark Huggett, Charlie Kahn, Stan Kerr, Roger Koenker, 
Asani Sarkar, Tom Ulen, participants of the seminars at the universities of Geneva, Carlos m, Lisbon, LllOd, and 
Gothenburg, and participants of the 11 th Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics 
for their contributions to this paper. The views expressed below and any errors that may remain are entirely my 
own. 
2 See, for example, Kyle (1989), Subrahmanyam (1991) and Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). 
3 However, legal scholars have paid a great deal of attention to insider trading. An impressive amount of work, 
mostly published in law joumals, followed the pioneering work by Manne (1966). See, for example, Scott (1980), 
Easterbrook (1981), Carlton and Fischel (1983), Easterbrook (1985), Haddock and Macey (1987), Manne (1987) 
and Macey (1991). 
4 Bhattacharya and Spiegel (1991) formally prove this result, although it can be traced back to Milgrom and 
Stokey (1982). 
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price-taking behavior is not the adequate framework to analyze issues of informed trading. Leland (1992), on the 
other hand, also considering the impact of ITR on social welfare, arrives at an ambiguous result: if production is 
not responsive to securities prices, then ITR is beneficial; otherwise, it is harmful. 
The major difference between this paper and those of Ausubel (1990) and Leland (1992), among others, 
is that this paper addresses in detail the relationship between risk and the welfare effects of ITR. Two out of the 
three reasons for which ITR is socially detrimental in the model presented below follow from risk-related arguments. 
Further, the risk reallocation generated by ITR, largely ignored in previous analyses, is also examined in detail 
below. Finally, the third reason for which ITR will be shown to be detrimental, related to the cost of monitoring 
the behavior of insiders, is also ignored by both Ausubel (1990) and Leland (1992), as well as by most other papers 
in the literature. 
I consider in this paper an economy under two policy regimes: one in which insider trading is restricted 
(the regulated market), and one in which it is not (the unregulated market). After deriving an equilibrium for each 
regime, I evaluate the impact of ITR on a securities market and on social welfare. Due to the lack of research on 
the relationship between ITR and social welfare, I pay special attention to the welfare issue. 
The model features three types of traders (insiders, outsiders, and liquidity traders) interacting with a 
market maker in a market for a risky asset. Insiders and outsiders possess private information about the future price 
of the risky asset; hence, their trading is informationally motivated. Liquidity traders, on the other hand, are 
uninformed and trade for exogenous reasons. Besides trading in the risky asset, all traders engage in the production 
of a cornmodity. Therefore, the model can be used to analyze the impact of ITR not on1y on a securities market but 
also on the real sector of the economy. 
Besides insiders, outsiders, liquidity traders, and a market maker, the model features a group of agents that 
do not participate in speculative activities. These individuals, referred to as workers, invest all their wealth in a risk-
free asset and engage in production of the cornmodity. Further, if insider trading is restricted, some of these workers 
are diverted to perform the task of enforcing ITR; that is, they act as regulators. 
The informational structure of the model reflects the fact that not only the insiders of a firm have access 
to nonpublic information that affects the future price of that firm's securities. Outsiders whose activities are related 
to the activities of the firm under consideration also possess such information. Thus, the model considers a 
framework in which informed traders acquire information about the future price of a risky asset as a byproduct of 
their activities. That is, information is costlessly acquired. 
An example might help. Let the risky asset under consideration be IBM stock. The price of this stock is 
affected by factors that affect IBM itself; for example, by the invention of a new mainframe created by IBM 
researchers. I refer to this type of information, when known by on1y a few traders related to IBM, as inside 
information. Further, I refer to those few traders that observe this (private) information as insiders. The price of 
IBM stock is also affected by factors that affect firms related to IBM; for example, by the invention of a new 
computer chip created by Intel researchers. I refer to this type of information, when known by on1y a few traders 
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related to Intel, as outside information. Further, I refer to those few traders that observe this (private) information 
as outsiders.s 
I assume below that aH traders (and workers) are risk averse. Under this assumption, the mathematical 
structure of the model is significantly more complicated than under risk neutrality.. In particular, a tractable closed-
form equilibrium for each regime cannot be derived. Therefore, numerical analysis is used to evaluate the impact 
of ITR on a securities market and on social welfare. 
I show in this paper that ITR has both beneficial and detrimental effects on a securities market. In 
particular, I show that ITR has a beneficial effect on market liquidity and current-price volatility, and a detrimental 
effect on future-price volatility, informational efficiency, and price predictability. In terms of welfare, I show that 
ITR makes insiders and workers worse off, outsiders and liquidity traders better off, and society as a whole worse 
off. largue below that three reasons explain this last result: First, in an unregulated market the volatility of 
securities prices is lower; hence, this market is less risky. Second, in an unregulated market insiders bear a part 
of the risk of the variability in securities prices; hence, there is a superior risk sharing among investors in this 
market. And, third, in an unregulated market no resources are diverted to the enforcement of ITR; hence, no 
production of goods and services is foregone in this market. Further, I show that most of the previous results are 
valid for a wide range of values of the parameters of the model, and that the conditions under which ITR makes 
society better off cannot be used to justify the imposition of this regulation. 
The rest of the paper is organized as foHows. In part 11, I introduce the model and derive two equilibria 
(one for the unregulated market and another for the regulated one). In part I1I, I evaluate the impact of ITR on a 
securities market and on social welfare for the base case of the model. In part IV, I perform a sensitivity analysis 
in order to determine the generality of the results established in part III. And, finally, in part V, I surnmarize the 
most important conclusions of the analysis. 
II- THE MODEL 
1.- Market microstructure 
Consider a two-date (one-period) economy where Odenotes the present (the beginning of the period) and 
1 denotes the future (the end of the period). There are two investment opportunities in this economy: a risk-free 
asset (F) that yields a certain return (P), and a risky asset (x); the analysis is focussed on the latter. Three types of 
traders interact in the market for the risky asset: insiders (indexed by N), outsiders (indexed by T), and liquidity 
traders (indexed by Q). AH these traders interact with a market maker either in an unregulated market (indexed by 
s Outsiders can alternatively be thought of as security analysts, portfolio managers, brokers, and arbitrageurs, 
among others. However, most of these "market professionals" acquire information at a cost, unlike the outsiders 
in the model that do it costlessly. One of the main reasons for including outsiders in the model is to show that they 
are benefitted by the imposition of ITR. This, in turn, provides support to the argument advanced by Haddock and 
Macey (l987b) that ITR largely stems from the pressure of market professionals on the SECo 
._--_._---------------,------------------------_. 
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U) or in a regulated market (indexed by R); that is, a market that restricts insider trading. Finally, there is a group 
of agents that do not participate in speculative activities. These agents, referred to as workers (indexed by K), 
simply invest their wealth in the risk-free asset.6 
Insiders, outsiders, liquidity traders, and workers are endowed with (certain) initial wealth \VI, which they 
can use to purchase a portfolio containing the risk-free asset and the risky asset. Yet, if insider trading is restricted, 
all these agents will be forced to forgo a proportion tj (O ~tj S; 1) of their initial wealth to bear the cost of ITR. Thus, 
let tRbe the rate at which traders and workers are taxed in the regulated market, and tu=O; that is, no taxes are paid 
in the unregulated market. Hence, the budget constraint of traders and workers is given by: 
(1)i=N,T,Q,K j=U,R 
where Fij is agent i's demand for the risk-free asset in the jth market, POj is the price of the risky asset in the jth 
market at the beginning of the period, and xij is agent i' s demand for the risky asset in the jth market. Since workers 
do not trade in the risky asset, then xKj=O. 
Between the beginning and the end of the period, all traders and workers engage in the production of a 
cornmodity. Thus, let Yij be (the monetary value oí) agent i's production of this cornmodity in the jth market. It is 
assumed that all traders produce the same amount of Y regardless of the type of market in which they trade; that 
is, YiU = YiR, for i=N,T,Q. However, this cannot be the case for everybody in the economy. For, if insider trading 
is restricted, someone has to perform the task of enforcing ITR, thus foregoing production of the cornmodity. It is 
assumed that, if the market is regulated, (some) workers will perform this task. Hence, workers' production of the 
cornmodity will be larger when insider trading is not restricted; that is, YKU >YKR' 
At the end of the period, when both trading and production are finished, traders and workers possess 
(random) terminal wealth given by: 
(2)i=N,T,Q.K j=U,R 
where -wL is agent i's terminal wealth in the jth market, and PI is the price of the risky asset at the end of the 
periodo This terminal price, which is exogenously determined, is given by: 
(3) 
where PI is the expected price of the risky asset given all publicly available information, and E and ;; are two 
random variables such that f - N(O,U;), ;; - N(O,~), and COV(E,;;) =0. That is, the future price of the risky asset 
6 In what follows, subscripts i will be used to index agents (i=N,T,Q,K) and subscripts j to index markets 
(j=U,R). 
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is determined by aH publicly available information and by two independent, normally-distributed random shocks.7 
The behavior of Iiquidity traders is not explicitly modelIed. They are assumed to demand a random quantity 
xQof the risky asset, such that XQ-N(O'0'6)' Tbis demand is assumed to be independent from the type of market 
(regulated or unregulated) in which Iiquidity traders trade. 8 It is further assumed that Cov(E,XQ)=Cov(fi,XQ)=O; 
that is, Iiquidity trading has no information content. 
Unlike Iiquidity traders, insiders and outsiders trade for informational reasons. AH traders observe all 
publicly available information about the future price of the risky asset, summarized in the parameter PI' Further, 
insiders privately (and costlessly) observe a realization of the random variable E (El), and outsiders privately (and 
also costlessly) observe a realization of the random variable fi (711).9 The first random shock (O arises in the firm 
that issues the risky asset under consideration; hence it is observed only by insiders. Tbe other random shock (fi) 
may be thought of as arising somewhere else in the economy, perhaps in a firm wbose activities are related to the 
activities of the firm under consideration; hence, it is observed only by outsiders. FolIowing Fishman and Hagerty 
(1992), it is assumed that insiders have access to information of higher quality; that is, O; <~. 
Insiders, outsiders, and Iiquidity traders are assumed to be risk averse. The market maker is assumed to 
be risk neutral and to make zero profits when selecting the price that clears the market for the risky asset. 10 
Finally, for the sake of completeness, workers are also assumed to be risk averse. 
Solving (1) for F ij and substituting into (2) yields: 
(4)i=N,T,QJ( j=U,R 
However, it is not the expected value of this terminal wealth (conditional on their private information) that insiders 
and outsiders are assumed to maximize. 11 This is due to the fact that, llOder risk aversion, unlike llOder risk 
neutrality, the variance of these investors' terminal wealth needs to be considered. 
7 Note that the future price of the risky asset does not depend on the type of market in which tbis asset is traded. 
However, Leland (1992) shows that securities prices would be, on average, higher when insider trading is allowed, 
thus encouraging corporate investment. This beneficial effect of insider trading does not arise in the model 
considered in this paper. 
8 It could altematively be assumed that the amollOt of Iiquidity trading depends on the type of market in which 
Iiquidity traders trade. However, an arbitrary difference in trading across markets would have to be assumed, which 
could cast doubt on the generality of the results derived below. 
9 A model in which outsiders acquire information at a (fixed) cost is analyzed by Fishman and Hagerty (1992). 
10 Hence, his welfare is not analyzed. 
11 For simplicity, and without loss of generality, the retum of the risk-free asset (P) is normalized to O in wbat 
folIows. 
7 
Insiders, outsiders, liquidity traders, and workers are assumed to have a negative exponential utility funetion 
(V), thus displaying eonstant absolute rísk aversion; that is: 
V ( _1) - 1 -di"': (5)¡ W¡ - -e i=N.T.Q.K 
where a¡ (a¡>O) is the absolute rísk aversion parameter,,2 Sinee ~l is normally distríbuted, eonditional on eaeh 
trader's (prívate) information set (",;),13 then the expected value of V eonditiooal 00 "'i is given by: 
(6)
i=N.T.Q.K 
Tbus, insiders and outsiders (but not liquidity traders and workers) are assumed to seleet, eonditional on their 
prívate information, the demand for the rísky asset that maximizes (6). It is clear, though, that maximizing this 
expeeted utility funetion is equivalent to maximizing the eertainty equivalent of wealth (CE), whieh is given by: 
(7)i=N.T.Q,K 
This follows from the faet that (6) is monotonically inereasing in (7). Tberefore, in what fol1ows, insiders and 
outsiders will be assumed to seleet the demand for the rísky asset that maximizes their eertainty equivalent of 
wealth. 
2.- Strategies and equilibria 
Definirion: An equilibrium is a realization of the random variable POj sueh that the following two conditions hold: 
1) Xú= argmax E[V¡(w;)lw¡=w¡] i=N.T j=U,R 
Xq 
il) POj = E (PIIX;j+Xu+XQ) j=U,R 
That is, an equilibrium is a (current) priee of the rísky asset that: first, arises from demands that maximize the 
utility of insiders and outsiders, eonditional on their prívate information;14 and, seeond, is effieient in the sense 
that it is equal to the expected (terminal) price of the rísk asset, conditional on all the information available to the 
market maker. 
12 This utility funetion is usually wrítten without the 1 in front. 1 have ineluded the 1 with the sole purpose of 
avoiding working with negative utilities. Obviously, the properties of this utility funetion are oot altered by this 
monotonie transformation. 
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The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of the period, endowments are distributed, 
information is revealed, and demands are submitted to the market maker, who sets the price that clears the market 
for the risky asset. At the end of the period, all uncertainty is resolved, the payoffs of the portfolios are realized 
and the production of the cornmodity is finished. Trading, in particular, is structured in two steps: First, insiders 
and outsiders observe a realization of E and 7j, respectively, and submit their demand for the risky asset conditional 
on such a realization. At the same time, liquidity traders submit their demand for the risky asset. Second, the market 
maker determines the price that clears the market for this asset. Following Kyle (1985), it is assumed that, when 
so doing, the market maker sets this price efficiently, thus making zero profits. That is, he sets the current price 
of the risky asset by taking into account all publicly available information and the order flow:5 This implies that 
the market maker sets the current price of the risky asset according to the expression: 
j=U,R (8) 
where Ctj is a parameter whose reciprocal measures the liquidity of the market. 
When selecting their portfolio, insiders and outsiders take this pricing function (but not the price of the 
risky asset) as given. That is, insiders and outsiders behave strategically in the sense that they take into account 
the effect of their demand on the (current) price of the risky asset, and they do so by incorporating into their 
maximization problem the market maker's pricing function. Note that this implies that neither insiders nor outsiders 
observe the (current) price at whichthey will trade. However, they both have a rational expectation of what this 
price will be. A rational expectations equilibrium exists when these expectations become self-fulfilling. 
Further, when selecting their ponfolio, insiders (outsiders) make a conjecture about what the outsiders' 
(insiders') demand for the risky asset will be. This yields the following two conjectures: 
Conjecture 1: An insider's demand for the risky asset is given by XNj=¡¡jE, for a given parameter ¡¡jO That is, an 
insider's demand is a linear function of his private information. 
Conjecture 2: An outsider's demand for the risky asset is given by xTj =/'j7j, for a given parameter /'j' That is, an 
outsider's demand is a linear function of his private information. 16 
In this framework, the market maker selects the parameter that determines the liquidity of the market, and 
insiders and outsiders select the parameter that determines their demando That is, the market maker selects Ctj' 
insiders select ¡¡j' and outsiders select /'j' 
15 The order flow provides the market maker with information beyond that which is publicly available. This is 
due to the fact that, as will be seen below, the demand of informed traders is based on their private information, 
which is correlated to the future price of the risky asset. 
16 As will be seen below, these conjectures are confirmed in equilibrium. That is, linear strategies are not an 
assumption but a resulto The plausibility of this type of strategies has been strengthened by work by Bhattacharya 
and Spiegel (1991), who analyze linear and nonlinear strategies and show that, if informed traders had to choose 
between them, they would choose the former over the latter. 
"-- -"---------------------,...------------------------
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This concludes the basic analytical structure in an unregulated market; that is, in a market where insider 
trading is allowed. In such a framework, the following theorem holds: 
Theorem 1: When all traders are risk averse and insidet trading is allowed, there exists an equilibrium 
characterized by the parameters: 
BU = (9) 
(10) 
(11) 
Prool Using (3), (4), (8), and conjecture 2, a representative insider's terminal wealth can be written as: 
(12) 
The expected value and variance of (12), both conditional on the insider's private information, are given, 
respectively, by: 
(13) 
(14) 
Thus, substituting (13) and (14) into (7), the insider's problem becomes: 
(15) 
Taking derivatives and solving for the insider's demand yields: 
(16) 
from which (lO) follows directly. 
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Similarly, using (3), (4), (8), and conjecture 1, a representative outsider's terminal wealth can be written 
as: 
(17) 
The expected value and variance of (17), both conditional on the outsider's private information, are given, 
respectively, by: 
(l8) 
(19) 
Thus, substituting (18) and (19) into (7), the outsider's problem becomes: 
(20) 
Taking derivatives and solving for the outsider's demand yields: 
(21) 
from which (11) fol1ows directly. 
Equations (10) and (11) form a system in f3u and 'Yu whose solution yields the equilibrium of the model. 
This equilibrium, however, must satisfy the restriction that the market maker sets prices efficiently. This implies 
that: 
(22) 
Finally, applying the projection theorem on (22) to solve for (xu yields (9).• 
Note from (10) and (11) that insiders and outsiders' demand for the risky asset depends on their degree 
of risk aversion. This implies, as will be seen below, that market liquidity, price volatility, informational efficiency 
and price predictability also depend on the risk aversion of these traders. Note, further, that the equilibrium derived 
is not in closed formo 
It is assumed that ITR is ful1y effective in the sense that it prevents insiders from trading; that is, under 
11 
ITR, XNR =(JR =0. 17 Thus, in a regulated market, the following theorem holds: 
Theorem 2: When all traders are risk averse and insider trading is restricted, there exists an equilibrium 
characterized by the parameters: 
(23) 
(24) 
Proo!' Using (3), (4), and (8), a representative outsider's terminal wealth can be written as: 
(25) 
The expected value and variance of (25), both conditional on the outsider's prívate infonnation, are given, 
respectively, by: 
(26) 
(27) 
Thus, substituting (26) and (27) into (7), the outsider's problem becomes: 
(28) 
Taking derivatives and solving for the outsider's demand yields: 
(29) 
from which (24) follows directly. 
17 This assumption is not crucial for the analysis (that is, its relaxation would not significantly change the results 
derived below), but it simplifies it substantially. 
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The equilibrium must satisfy the restriction that the market maker sets prices efficiently. When insider 
trading is regulated this restriction implies that: 
(30) 
Finally, applying the projection theorem on (30) to solve for aR yields (23).• 
ID· SIMULATION OF THE MODEL: BASE CASE 
The complexity of the equilibria derived above precludes a tractable analysis in closed-form. Therefore, 
the impact of ITR on a securities market and on social welfare is evaluated using numerical analysis. The impact 
of ITR on a securities market is evaluated through its effect on market liquidity, price volatility, informational 
efficiency, and price predictability.18 Funher, its impact on social welfare is evaluated through its effect on the 
welfare of insiders, outsiders, liquidity traders, and workers. I perform below an ex-ante analysis; that is, an 
analysis of the impact of ITR before the realization of the random variables of the model. 
1.- The expressions to be evaluated 
The liquidity of the market (L), which is inversely related to the change in price that follows the arrival 
of an order, can be measured by the inverse of the parameter aj of the market maker's pricing function; that is: 
L. = (0:.)-1 j=U,R (31) 
J J 
The volatility of current prices (CV) can be measured by the (unconditional) variance of POj; that is: 
(32)j=U,R 
The volatility of future prices (FV), on the other hand, can be measured by the variance ofPl> conditional 
on the equilibrium value of POj; that is: 
j=U,R (33) 
The informational efficiency of the market (lE) reflects the amount of information revealed by securities 
prices, and can be measured by the inverse of the volatility of future prices; that is: 
(34)j=U,R 
18 These characteristics are also considered, in a different model, by Leland (1992). 
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Finally, a measure of price predictability is given by the correlation coefficient between POi and PI (r); that 
is: 
j=U,R (35) 
As stated above, due to the scarcity of research on the relationship between ITR and social welfare, special 
emphasis is placed on the welfare issue. The welfare analysis is performed in terms of a representative agent of each 
type, and is performed ex-ante. Hence, the expectations taken below are unconditional expectations. 
An insider's expected terminal utility in the unregulated market and that in the regulated market are given, 
respectively, by: 
(36) 
(37) 
An outsider's expected terminal utility in the unregulated market and that in the regulated market, on the 
other hand, are given, respectively, by: 
(38) 
(39) 
A liquidity trader's expected terminal utility in the unregulated market and that in the regulated market are 
given, respectively by: 
(40) 
(41) 
A worker's (certain) terminal utility in the unregulated market is given by: 
(42) 
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When insider trading is restricted, on the other hand, sorne workers are diverted to perform the task of enforcing 
ITR, thus foregoing production of the cornmodity. Hence, as argued above, workers produce a lower amollOt of 
this cornmodity in a regulated market. Under competitive conditions, the compensation received by those workers 
diverted to enforce ITR must equal their opportunity cost. Hence, the cost of ITR, borne by traders and workers 
through the tax system, is given by the value of the production workers forgo when they act as regulators; that is, 
by YKU-YKR =(w~+w~+wg+W~)tR' Therefore, a worker's (certain) terminal utility in the regulated market is given 
by: 
(43) 
This concludes the list of expressions to be evaluated. I tum now to consider the base case of the model 
with parameters that reflect average market data. These parameters will be used to find an explicit solution for both 
equilibria, which, in tum, will be used to evaluate the impact of ITR on a securities market and on social welfare. 
2.- The base case 
The values of the parameters for the base case of the model are reported in Table 1. In order to facilitate 
the comparison to related work, price volatility and risk aversion parameters were taken from Leland (1992). 
TABLE 1: PARAMETERS FOR THE BASE CASE 
a; ~ CJ2Q tR a¡ WO I Y¡U 
0.015 0.025 0.010 0.ססOO2805 2 1 1 
Although the volatility of PI (a;+~= .04) is taken from Leland (1992), the partition between O; (.015) and 
~ (.025) is arbitrary. Note that this partition satisfies the restriction that the information observed by insiders is 
more precise than that observed by outsiders; that is, a; <~. The variability of liquidity trading (~= .010) and the 
risk aversion parameters (a¡=2) are also taken from Leland (1992). The initial wealth of traders and workers (vi¡) 
is normalized to 1, and so is their production of the cornmodity in the unregulated market (Y¡u). The tax rate 
imposed on traders and workers in the regulated market (l¡¡) follows from the cost of ITR, which, in tum, follows 
from the production foregone by the imposition of this regulation. The foregone production in the model attempts 
to mirror the foregone production in the economy, thus implying a cost of ITR equal to .0001122:9 
The values reported in Table 1 can be used to compute an explicit solution for the model. The solution of 
the system for both the regulated and the unregulated market is reported below in Table 2.20 It is worthwhile to 
mention that the equilibria reported in this table are highly insensitive to the initial values needed to solve both 
19 These calculations are shown in part I of the appendix. 
20 This table follows from equations (9)-(11), (23)-(24), and the values reported in Table 1. 
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systems numerically. 
TABLE 2: EQUILIBRIUM VALUES FOR BEHAVIORAL PARAMETERS 
av f3v 'Yv aR 'YR 
0.999893 0.491975 0.493212 I 0.790298 0.616109 
These equilibria can now be used to evaluate the impact of ITR on a securities market. Thus, market 
liquidity, current and future price volatility, inforrnational efficiency and price predictability in both the regulated 
and the unregulated market are reported below in Table 3.21 
TABLE 3: SECURITIES MARKETS 
• U R (U-R) 
L 1.00010701 1.26534547 -0.2652384 
CV 0.01970782 0.01217273 0.00753508 
FV 0.02029219 0.02782725 -0.0075350 
lE 49.2800366 35.9359974 13.3440391 
r 0.70192249 0.55165092 0.15027156 
From a qualitative point of view, all these results, derived under the assumption of risk averse agents, 
confirm those derived by Estrada (1994a) from a model with risk neutral agents; they also confirm those derived 
from a different model by Leland (1992). That is, ITR increases market liquidity, decreases the volatility of current 
prices, increases the volatility of future prices, decreases the informational efficiency of the market,22 and decreases 
the correlation between current and future prices. An intuitive interpretation of these results is provided by Estrada 
(1994a). Under risk aversion, these results are explained on the same lines. 
The equilibria reported in Table 2 can also be used to evaluate the impact of ITR on social welfare. To 
this purpose, let social welfare in the jth market (SW) be defined as the joint utility of insiders, outsiders, liquidity 
traders, and workers; that is, SWj = E(VNj +VTj +VQj +VKj) , where Vij is agent i's utility in the jth market. The utility 
of each representative agent, as well as social welfare, in both the regulated and the unregulated market are reported 
21 This table follows from equations (31 )-(35) and the values reported in Tables 1-2. 
22 Fishman and Hagerty (1992) build a model in which, if insider trading is allowed, prices may become less 
efficient. In their model, this happens when insider trading deters a sufficiently large number of market analysts, 
who withdraw from the market thus ceasing to acquire (costly) information. However, Meulbroek (1992) and 
Comell and Sirri (1992) present solid evidence establishing that insider trading corrects prices significantly and in 
the right direction. 
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below in Table 4. 23 
TABLE 4: SOCIAL WELFARE (UTILITIES) 
• U R (U-R) 
E(VN) 0.98181800 0.98168333 0.00013466 
E(VT) 0.98190598 0.98195879 -0.ססOO528 
E(Vo) 0.98130307 0.98137883 -0.0000757 
E(VK) 0.98168436 0.98168333 0.00000102 
SW 3.92671142 3.92670429 0.0ססoo713 
It follows from Table 4 that ITR malees insiders and workers worse off, and outsiders and liquidity traders 
better off. Further, when all gains and losses are aggregated, ITR imposes a net cost on society. Therefore, under 
risk aversion (as well as under risk neutrality), ITR makes society unambiguously worse off. 
It is important to determine whether the 10ss that ITR imposes on society under risk aversion is higher or 
lower than the 10ss it imposes under risk neutrality. In order to make the results under risk aversion comparable 
to those under risk neutrality, the utility of traders and workers has to be recomputed in terms of certainty 
equivalents. The result of this new computation is shown in Table 5.24 
TABLE 5: SOCIAL WELFARE (CERTAINTY EQUIVALENTS) 
U R (U-R)I • I 
CEN 2.00366169 1.99997195 0.00368973 
CEr 2.00608703 2.00754841 -0.0014613 
CEo 1.98969816 1.99172824 -0.0020300 
CEK 2.0ססoo000 1.99997195 0.ססOO2804
 
SW 7.99944689 7.99922055 0.00022633 
It is shown by Estrada (1994a) that, under risk neutrality, the 10ss that ITR imposes on society is equal to 
the cost of regulating the market (.0001122). Table 5 shows that, under risk aversion, ITR imposes a higher social 
10ss (.00022633). In fact, for the base case of the model, the social loss imposed by ITR under risk aversion is more 
than twice as high than that imposed under risk neutrality. Therefore, ITR is less desirable under risk aversion than 
it is under risk neutrality. 
23 This table follows from equations (36)-(43) and the values reported in Tables 1-2. 
24 This table follows from equation (7) and the values reported in Tables 1-2. 
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This result is critical and needs to be explained in detail. Recall that a certainty equivalent of wealth is 
determined by the expected value and the variance ofthat wealth, and by a risk aversion parameter. Note that, since 
the imposition of ITR does not affect the risk aversion parameter, then the change in a certainty equivalent of wealth 
that results from the imposition of ITR must stem solely from changes in the expected value or the variance of that 
wealth. Note, finally, that the imposition of ITR reallocates the expected profits from insider trading from insiders 
to outsiders and liquidity traders, rhus reallocaring nor only wealrh bur also risk. 
For the base case of the model, it is the case that the sum of the expected values of the terminal wealth 
of all agents in the unregulated market is larger than such a sum in the regulated market.25 In fact, the difference 
between the former and the latter is exactly equal to the cost of ITR. This is the result derived by Estrada (1994a) 
under risk neutrality; that is, the cost of ITR is the opportunity cost of the resources diverted to enforce this 
regulation. However, under risk aversion, that is not the end of the story. 
As argued aboye, the reallocation of the expected insider trading profits from insiders to outsiders and 
liquidity traders reallocates not only wealth but also risk. In fact, for the base case of the model, it is the case that 
the sum of the variances of the terminal wealth of all agents in the regulated market is larger than such a sum in 
the unregulated market. 26 This result is explained by the fact that ITR prevents inside information from being 
reflected in securities prices at the beginning of the periodo Since, as argued by Manne (1966), this inside 
information would have corrected securities prices in the right direction, then it would have lowered the volatility 
of these prices. Put differently, ITR accentuates the price change that follows the arrival of new information. 
Therefore, when ITR is imposed, securities prices become more volatile;27 that is, rhe regulared marker is more 
risky rhan rhe unregulared marker. 
In addition, a third perverse effect of ITR is that of forcing outsiders and liquidity traders to bear all the 
risk of the volatility of securities prices. Thus, it is important to note that ITR not only prevents insiders from 
trading; it also prevents them from bearing any risk. Put differently, rhe risk sharing in rhe regulared markel is 
inferior ro lhe risk sharing in rhe unregulaled marker. Therefore, even íf both the regulated market and the 
unregulated market were equally risky (and ITR were costless), social welfare would be 10wer in the former 
market.28 
Note that last two arguments establish that ITR íncreases the riskiness of the market and worsens the risk 
25 I:¡_N.T.Q.KE(wlu)=8 >I:¡_N.T,Q,KE(wIR)=7.9998878. 
26 I:¡_N.T,Q,KVar(wlR)= .0006673 >I:¡_N.T,Q,KVar(w\u) = .0005531, where Var(w~R)=Var(w~u)=Var(w~R)=O. 
28 It may be argued that, besides forcing insiders out of the market, ITR may also encourage other investors 
to enter the market. However, the recent imposition of ITR in Japan and in the European Union does not seem to 
give empírical support to this claim. 
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sharing among investors, botb of whieh have a negative impaet on social welfare. Therefore, tbe imposition of ITR 
may be tbought of as a realloeation of resourees from an activity tbat ereates utility (produetion) to an aetivity tbat 
destroys utility (regulation). 
In sum, ITR has been shown to have tbe same qualitative effeet on a seeurities markets as it has under risk 
neutrality. That is, it inereases market liquidity, deereases eurrent-priee volatility, inereases future-price volatility, 
deereases the informational efficieney of tbe market. and decreases priee predietability. In tenns of welfare. ITR 
has been shown to force a eostly realloeation of wealtb and risk. Thus, an unregulated market improves upon a 
regulated market for tbree reasons: First, in tbe unregulated market seeurities priees are less volatile; henee, tbis 
market is less risky. Seeond. in tbe unregulated market insiders bear part of the risk of tbe volatility of seeurities 
priees; henee, tbere is a superior risk sharing in this market. And, third, in tbe unregulated market no resourees 
are diverted to tbe enforeement of ITR; henee, no produetion is foregone in tbis market. 
3.- An altemative case 
The result that ITR is less desirable under risk aversion tban it is under risk neutrality invites speeulation 
about whether ITR may be socially detrimental even if it is eostless. 29 In faet, as shown by Table 6, this is 
preeisely the case. 
TABLE 6: SOCIAL WELFARE UNDER COSTLESS ITR (UTILITIES) 
• U R (U-R) 
E(VN) 0.98181800 0.98168436 0.00013364 
E(VT) 0.98190598 0.98195980 -0.0000538 
E(VQ) 0.98130307 0.98137988 -0.0000768 
E(VK) 0.98168436 0.98168436 0.00000000 
SW 3.92671142 3.92670840 0.0ססoo302 
Table 6 shows tbat when ITR is eostless it still makes insiders worse off, and outsiders and liquidity traders 
better off. Yet, a eostless ITR does not make workers worse off (as it does when it is eostly) beeause workers 
neither trade nor have to bear any tax on tbeir wealtb. When all the gains and losses tbat result from the imposition 
of a costless ITR are aggregated, tbe basie result derived above still remains; tbat is, ITR makes soeiety 
unambiguously worse off. 
Tbe faet that ITR is soeially detrimental even if it is eostless is a strong result, whieh, in faet, follows from 
two arguments outlined above. First, from tbe faet tbat ITR inereases tbe volatility of seeurities priees, tbus making 
tbe regulated market more risky. This inerease in risk. obviously, imposes a eost on risk averse traders. And, 
29 I would like to thank Asani Sarkar for suggesting me this line of inquiry . 
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second, from the fact that ITR prevents insiders from bearing any risk, thus forcing outsiders and liquidity traders 
to bear a11 the risk of the volatility of securlties prices. Tbis decrease in risk sharing imposes an additional cost on 
risk averse traders. 
IV- SIMULATlON OF THE MODEL: SENSITlVITY ANALYSIS 
1 explore in this pan whether the results derived in the previous pan are valid only for the base case of 
the model or they are valid for a wider range of values of the parameters of the model. As before, 1 divide this 
inquiry iOlo results related to securities markets and results related to social welfare. 1 perfonn the sensitivity 
analysis with respect to changes in the variability of inside and outside infonnation and in the variability of liquidity 
trading, as well as with respect to changes in the risk aversion of aH traders.30 
1.- ITR and securities markets 
Recall that under risk neutrality, as well as in the base case under risk aversion, the imposition of ITR 
increases market liquidity, decreases the volatility of current prices, increases the volatility of future prices, 
decreases the infonnational efficiency of the market, and decreases the correlation between current and future prices. 
The purpose of the sensitivity analysis is to determine whether these results hold for a wide range of values of the 
parameters of the model. Table Al in pan III of the appendix summarizes the results of the sensitivity analysis on 
securities markets. 
The regulated market was shown to be more liquid than the unregulated market. Tbe sensitivity analysis 
shows that this beneficial effect of ITR is increasing in the variability of inside infonnation and in the variability 
of liquidity trading, and decreasing in the variability of outside infonnation. Further, this beneficial effect is 
decreasing in the risk aversion of insiders and increasing in that of outsiders. AH these results are illustrated in the 
upper half of Figures Al-AS in pan 11 of the appendix. 
The volatility of current prices was shown to be lower in the regulated market. The sensitivity analysis 
shows that the cost of not imposing ITR is increasing in the variability of inside and outside infonnation, as well 
as in the variability of liquidity trading. Further, this cost is decreasing in the risk aversion of insiders and 
increasing in that of outsiders. 
The volatility of future prices was shown to be higher in the regulated market. The sensitivity analysis 
shows that this cost of ITR is increasing in the variability of inside and outside infonnation, as well as in the 
variability of liquidity trading. Further, this cost is decreasing in the risk aversion of insiders and increasing in that 
of outsiders. 
30 The range of variation of the parameters of the model in the sensitivity analysis is as follows: Tbe variability 
of inside infonnation (a:) ranges from .002 to .024; the variability of outside infonnation (U;) from .016 to .038; 
the variability of liquidity trading (al» from .002 to .024; and, finally, the risk aversion of insiders (aN), outsiders 
(aT) , and liquidity traders (80) from .5 to 8. 
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The regulated market was shown to be informationally less efficient than the unregulated market. The 
sensitivity analysis shows that the loss of informational efficiency due to the imposition of ITR is first increasing 
and then decreasing in the variability of inside information,31 and decreasing in the variability of outside 
information, as wel1 as in the variability of liquidity trading. Further, this cost is decreasing in the risk aversion of 
insiders, and first increasing and then decreasing in the risk aversion of outsiders. 32 Al1 these results are iIIustrated 
in the lower half of Figures Al-AS, in pan 11 of the appendix. 
Finally, the correlation between current and future prices was shown to be lower in the regulated market. 
The sensitivity analysis shows that this cost of ITR is increasing in the variability of inside information and in the 
variability of Iiquidity trading, and decreasing in the variability of outside information. Funher, this cost is 
decreasing in the risk aversion of insiders and increasing in that of outsiders. 
In sum, the beneficial effect of ITR on market Iiquidity and current-price volatility, and its detrimental 
effect on future-price volatility, informational efficiency, and price predictability hold for a wide range of values 
of the parameters of the modeI. I turo now to discuss the results of the sensitivity analysis on social welfare.33 
2.- ITR and social welfare 
Jli.s shown above for the base case of the model, the imposition of ITR makes insiders and workers worse 
off, outsiders and Iiquidity traders better off. and society as a whole worse off. The sensitivity analysis shows that, 
except in the specific cases to be considered below, these results hold for a wide range of values of the parameters 
of the modeI. 
Table A2 in pan III of the appendix summarizes the results of the sensitivity analysis on social welfare. 
A brief explanation for these results is provided below. It is imponant to notice, however, that the effects described 
below are on1y those that are driving each result; a wide variety of second-order effects will be ignored in the 
discussion. It is also imponant to notice that, throughout the sensitivity analysis, it is always the case that E(VNU-
V NR) ~o, E(VTU-VTR) S:O, E(VQU-VQR) S:O, and E(VKU-VKR) ~O; that is, ITR never makes insiders and workers better 
off, or outsiders and Iiquidity traders worse off. Put differently, changes in the parameters of the model change the 
magnitude, but not the sign, of the individual gains and losses that result from the imposition of ITR. 
It should be noted that changes in the variability of inside and outside information, in the variability of 
Iiquidity trading, and in the risk aversion of insiders, outsiders, and liquidity traders have an impact in the welfare 
31 The loss of informational efficiency turos from increasing to decreasing somewhere between ~ =.018 and 
~=.020. This is shown in the lower half of figure Al, in pan 11 of the appendix. 
32 The loss of informational efficiency turos from increasing to decreasing somewhere between aT =2 and 
aT =2.S. This is shown in the lower half of figure AS, in pan 11 of the appendix. 
33 Note that no sensitivity analysis was performed with respect to changes in the risk aversion of Iiquidity 
traders. This is due to the fact that liquidity traders trade randomIy, and, therefore, their attitude towards risk has 
no impact on a securities market. 
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of traders and workers through their impact on a securities market. Therefore, since workers do not trade, their 
welfare (which could only be affected by cbanges in the cost of ITR) remains constant througbout the sensitivity 
analysis. 34 
An increase in O; increases the expected profits from insider trading thus increasing E(VNU)' but bas no 
effect on E(VNR) because insiders do not trade in the regulated market. Further, since the expected profits from 
insider trading are increasing in 0;, so are the gains that outsiders and Iiquidity traders obtain from the imposition 
of ITR. Therefore, the loss that ITR imposes on insiders, as well as the gain that outsiders and liquidity traders 
obtain from this regulation, are all increasing in the variability of inside information. 
An increase in ~ lowers the Iiquidity of the market and increases the volatility of securities prices, thus 
baving a negative impact on E(VNU); obviously, it has no impact on E(VNR). An increase in~, on the otber band, 
increases outsiders' expected profits from trading, tbus increasing botb E(VTU ) and E(VTR). Since the risk sbaring 
in the regulated market is inferior to tbat in the unregulated market, then E(VTU) increases more rapidly than E(VTR)' 
Finally, an increase in ~ lowers both E(VQU) and E(VQR) as a result of the decrease in the Iiquidity of the market 
and tbe increase in price volatility. Since the risk sharing in the regulated market is inferior to that in the 
unregulated market, then E(VQR) decreases more rapidly than E(VQU)' In sum, the loss that ITR imposes on insiders, 
as well as the gain that outsiders and Iiquidity traders obtain from this regulation, are all decreasing in tbe variability 
of outside information. 
An increase in 0'6 increases tbe expected profits from insider trading (due to a camouflage effect), thus 
increasing E(VNU); obviously, it has no impact on E(VNR). An increase in 0'6, on the other band, increases both 
E(VTU) and E(VTR), increasing the latter more rapidly than the former due to tbe more rapid increase in Iiquidity 
in the regulated market. Finally, an increase in 0'6 lowers both E(VQU) and E(VQR), lowering the former more 
rapidly tban the latter due, again, to tbe more rapid increase in Iiquidity in the regulated market. In sum, the loss 
that ITR imposes on insiders, as well as the gain that outsiders and Iiquidity traders obtain from this regulation, are 
all increasing in tbe variability of Iiquidity trading. 
Tbe sensitivity analysis shows that an increase in tbe variability of inside or outside information, or in the 
variability of Iiquidity trading, increase the volatility of securities prices, thus increasing the risk to be boro by 
society. Hence both SWu and SWR decrease as 0;, ~ or 0'& increase. Further, since the risk sbaring in tbe 
unregulated market is superior to that in the regulated market, then SWR decreases more rapidly than SWu• 
Therefore, the social cost 01lTR is increasing in the variability 01 inside and outside information, as well as in the 
variability 01 liquidity trading. Tbis result is illustrated in Figures A6-A8 (and accompanying tables), in part 11 of 
tbe appendix. 
34 Tbrougbout tbis analysis, E(VKu-VKR)=.OOOOO102. 
- ---------------~~~~--------------------------------------~-
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The sensitivity analysis a1so shows that the loss that ITR imposes on insiders is decreasing in their risk 
aversion. In fact, when insiders are highly risk averse, ITR imposes a negligible 10ss on them.3S Further, the gain 
that outsiders and liquidity traders obtain from ITR is not significantly affected by changes in the risk aversion of 
insiders. 36 Finally, the social cost of ITR is decreasing in the risk aversion of insiders. Thus, somewhere between 
aN=2 and aN=2.5 the gain obtained by outsiders and liquidity traders begins to outweigh the 10ss that ITR imposes 
on insiders and workers; that is, ITR becomes socially beneficial. 
This result is explained is as follows. Recall that ITR not only generates a reallocation of wealth from 
insiders to outsiders and liquidity traders but a1so generates a reallocation of risk from the former to the latter. Thus, 
when insiders are more risk averse than outsiders and liquidity traders, ITR reallocates risk to traders (outsiders 
and liquidity traders) that bear that risk at a 10wer cost than insiders. Hence, as the risk aversion of insiders 
increases, the risk reallocation becomes more beneficial. Therefore, when the risk aversion ofinsiders is high, ITR 
is socially beneficial. This result is illustrated in Figure A9 (and accompanying table), in part 11 of the appendix. 
The sensitivity analysis a1so shows that the loss that ITR imposes on insiders, and the gain that liquidity 
traders obtain from this regulation, are not significantly affected by changes in the risk aversion of outsiders.37 The 
gain that outsiders obtain from ITR, on the other hand, is decreasing in their risk aversion.38 Finally, the social 
cost of ITR is increasing in the risk aversion of outsiders. Thus, somewhere between a¡. = 1.5 and aT=2, the gain 
obtained by outsiders and liquidity traders ceases to outweigh the 10ss that ITR imposes on insiders and workers. 
Thís is due to the fact that, as the risk aversion of outsiders increases, the risk reallocatíon becomes more costly. 
Therefore, when the risk aversion of outsiders is low, ITR is socially beneficial. This result is illustrated in Figure 
AlO (and accompanying table), in part 11 of the appendix. 
Finally, the sensitivity analysis shows that the loss that ITR imposes on insiders and the gain that outsiders 
obtain from this regulation are not affected by changes in the risk aversion of liquidity traders.39 The gain that 
liquidity traders obtain from ITR, on the other hand, is decreasing in their risk aversion.4O Finally, the social cost 
of ITR is increasing in the risk aversion of liquidity traders. Thus, somewhere between éIc,¡ = 1.5 and ao = 2, the gain 
36 For aN=.5, E(VTR-VTu)=.0000528 and E(VQR-VQu)=.0000757, whereas for aN=8, E(VTR-VTu)=.0000527 
and E(VQR-VQU) = .ססOO756. 
37 For aT=.5, E(VNU-VNR)= .00013468 and E(VQR-VQU)= .ססOO757, whereas for aT=8, E(VNU-VNR)= .00013471 
and E(VQR-VQU)=.0000766. 
39 For .5~8o~8, E(VNU-VNR)=.00013467 and E(VTR-VTu)=.0000528. 
40 For 80=.5, E(VQR-VQU)=.0003803, whereas for aQ=8, E(VQR-VQU)=0. 
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obtained by outsiders and liquidity traders ceases to outweigh the loss that ITR imposes insiders and workers. This 
is due to the fact that, as the risk aversion of liquidity traders increases, the risk reallocation becomes more costly. 
Therefore, when the risk aversion 01 liquidity traders is low, ITR is socially beneficial. This result is illustrated in 
Figure All (and accompanying table), in part 11 of the appendix. 
Note from Figures A9, AlO, and AIl that ITR tums from detrimental to beneficial slightly beyond aN =2, 
and from beneficial to detrimental slightly before ar=2 and ao=2. This is due to the fact that, in the sensitivity 
analysis, the risk aversion of two representative traders is fixed at 2 and the risk aversion of the third representative 
trader is subject to changes. Hence, levels of risk aversion around 2 become a threshold. In other words, high and 
low levels of risk aversion should not be interpreted as higher or lower than 2, but as high and low with respect 
to the risk aversion of other traders. Therefore, the last three results derived above can be summarized as follows: 
llinsiders are more risk averse than outsiders and liquidity traders, then ITR is socially beneficial. Put differently, 
ITR is socially beneficial when it generates a reallocation of risk to traders (outsiders and liquidity traders) that can 
bear that risk at a lower cost than insiders. Under these circumstances, ITR lowers the social cost imposed by the 
volatility of securities prices, thus increasing social welfare. 
A final important remark is in order. Note that ITR was shown to make society better off only when the 
risk reallocation generated by this regulation lowers the social cost of the volatility of securities prices. As shown 
above, this occurs when the risk aversion of insiders is high relative to that of outsiders and liquidity traders. 
However, casual empiricism seems to suggest that, in reality, the opposite pattem of risk aversion is observed; that 
is, insiders seem to be less risk averse than outsiders and liquidity traders. 41 In addition, it does not seem plausible 
to justify the imposition of a regulation on the basis of differences in the risk aversion across traders, when the latter 
is so difficult (if not impossible) to justify empirically. In other words, the conditions under which ITR makes 
society better off seem to be either inconsistent with casual empiricism or very difficult to justify from an empirical 
point of view, and, therefore, they cannot be used to justify the imposition of such a regulation. 
v- CONCLUSIONS 
I have evaluated in this paper the impact of ITR on a securities market and on social welfare under the 
assumption that all agents are risk averse. In terms of securities markets, ITR was shown to have both beneficial 
and detrimental effects. In particular, ITR was shown to increase market liquidity, decrease current-price volatility, 
increase future-price volatility, decrease the informational efficiency of the market, and decrease the correlation 
between current and future prices. These results were shown to be valid not only for the base case of the model but 
also for all values of the parameters used in the sensitivity analysis. 
41 Sorne of the most notorious insiders have been arbitrageurs (like Ivan Boesky) or investment bankers (like 
Dennis Levine). It seems plausible to think that these traders, who repeatedly invest large sums of money in search 
for a quick profit, are inherently less risk averse than liquidity traders, who trade for liquidity reasons. 
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In terms of welfare, ITR was shown to malee insiders and workers worse off, outsiders and liquidity traders 
better off, and society as a whole worse off. The sensitivity analysis validated these conclusions for a wide range 
of values of the parameters of the model. It was establisbed tbat the imposition of ITR forces a reallocation of 
wealth and risk that lowers social welfare for three reasons: First, in an unregulated market securities prices are 
less volatile; hence, this market is less risky. Second, in an unregulated market insiders bear a part of the risk of 
the volatility of securities prices; bence, there is a superior risk sbaring in this market. And, tbird, in an unregulated 
market no resources are diverted to the enforcement of ITR; bence, no production is foregone in this market. The 
first two arguments explain why under risk aversion, unlike under risk neutrality, ITR is socially detrimental even 
if it is costless. 
Finally, formal conditions were established under which ITR malees society better off. In particular, ITR 
is socially beneficial when insiders are more risk averse than outsiders and liquidity traders. In this case, ITR forces 
a reallocation of risk that lowers the social cost of price volatility, thus increasing social welfare. However, such 
attitudes toward risk, if observable at all, seem to be at odds with casual empiricism. Hence, it is quite arguable 
that a risk-related argument could be used to support the imposition of ITR. 
In sum, 1 have argued in this paper that society should not waste resources in preventing insiders from 
trading on the basis of their private infonnation. Regardless of the public perception about insider trading, 1 have 
shown that its restriction imposes more costs than benefits. Thus, the elimination of ITR would ultimately result 
in a reallocation of resources to a more efficiem use and in a subsequent increase in social welfare. And that is what 
economics is all about. 42 
42 lt is acknowledged that due to the (unfair?) lack of popularity of insider trading, there may be no government 
willing to eliminate ITR completely. An intermediate step in the process of deregulating insider trading could be 
to allow this practice and to impose a tax on insider trading profits. Estrada (l994b) analyzes this issue in detail, 
and shows that such a policy dominates ITR in the sense that it yields a higher level of social welfare. 
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APPENDIX 
l· THE COST OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION 
1 briefly show in this pan tbe calculations that yield a cost of ITR equal to .0001122 and a tax rate of 
.00002805. 
Let the potential production in the economy be equal to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) plus the budget 
of the Securities and Exchange Conunission (BSEC). Further, let the actual production in the economy be equal to 
the GDP. Hence, the difference between the potential and the actual production yields the cost of ITR; tbat is, the 
resources allocated to the SECo It is, of course, a simplification to assume that tbe whole budget of the SEC is 
allocated to enforce ITR. 
Since each representative agent is assumed to produce 1, then the potential production in the model 
(YNU + YTU + YQU + YKU) is equal to 4. The actual production in the model (YNR + YTR + YQR + YKR)' on the other hand, 
is an unknown. In order for the relationship between the potential and the actual production in the model to be 
consistent with that relationship in the economy, the actual production in the model must solve from: 
(YNR + YTR + YQR+ YKR) = (YNU+ YTU + YQu + YKu)IIt(GDP)/(GDP+BSEC) 
which yields an actual production of 3.9998878. 1 Hence, the cost of ITR is equal to 4-3.9998878=.0001122. 
Finally, since the tax rate imposed on each agent's initial wealth solves from: 
(YNU+ YTU + YQU+ YKU)-(YNR + YTR+YQR+ YKR) = tRIIt(w~+w~+w8+w~) 
where, by assumption, w~+w~+w8+w~=4, then the tax rate imposed on traders and workers is equal to 
tR= .0001122/4 = .00002805. 
11- SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS: SELECTED RESULTS 
Figures AI-A5 illustrate the response of market liquidity and informational efficiency to changes in the 
variability of inside and outside information, the variability of liquidity trading, and the risk aversion of insiders 
and outsiders. Figures A6-All (and accompanying tables) illustrate the response of social welfare to changes in the 
same parameters, and to changes in the risk aversion of liquidity traders. 
I In 1991, the GDP was $5,671,800,000,000 (Economic Repon olthe Presiden!, 1992, p.298) and the budget 
of the SEC was $159,083,000 (Budget 01 the United States Governmen!. Fiscal Year 1993, p. AI-I032). 
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FIGURE Al: SECURITIES MARKETS AND INSIDE INFORMATION 
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FIGURE A2: SECURITIES MARKETS AND OUTSIDE INFORMATION 
MARKET LIQUIDITY 
0.49 
0.48 
0.4'1 
0.'12 
0.'1 
0.38 
0.36 
S' 0.3'1 
\J 
-' 
0.32 
I 
r\
a: c.i 
':f 0.28 
0.26 
0.24 
0.22 
0.2 
0.18 
0.15 
0.1'1 
0.018 0.02 
VARIANCE OF OUT510E INFORMATION 
INFDRMATIDNAL EFFICIENCY 
22 
21 
20 
19 
18 
17 
16 
I 15 
S' 
~ 1'1 
19 
12 
11 
1D 
II 
8 
0.016 0.02 
VARIANCE OF OUT510E INFORMATION 
28 
FIGURE A3: SECURITIES MARKETS AND LIQUIDITY TRADING 
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FIGURE A4: SECURITIES MARKETS AND INSIDERS' RISK AVERSION 
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FIGURE A6: SOCIAL WELFARE AND INSIDE INFORMATION 
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FIGURE A7: SOCIAL WELFARE AND OUTSIDE INFORMATION 
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FIGURE A8: SOCIAL WELFARE AND LIQUIDITY TRADING 
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FIGURE A9: SOCIAL WELFARE AND INSIDERS' RISK AVERSION 
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FIGURE A1O: SOCIAL WELFARE AND OUTSIDERS' RISK AVERSION 
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FIGURE All: SOCIAL WELFARE AND LIQUIDITY TRADERS' RISK AVERSION 
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m· SENSITMTY ANALYSIS: SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
TABLE Al: SECURITIES MARKETS 
• if. O; q2Q aN aT lo 
Lu ~ ~ t t t -
LR t ~ t - t -
LR-Lu t ~ t ~ t -
CVu t t ~ ~ ~ -
CVR ~ t ~ - ~ -
CVU·CVR t t t ~ t -
FVu t t t t t -
FVR t t t - t -
FVR-FVu t t t ~ t -
IEu ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -
.IER ~ ~ ~ ~ -
IEu-IER t/P ~ ~ ~ t/~b -
ru ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -
rR ~ t ~ - ~ -
rU-rR t ~ t ~ t -
Table Al shows whether a given market eharaeteristie (row) inereases (t) or deereases (~) as a result of 
an inerease in a given parameter (eolumn). More than one arrow in a box indieates a reversion in the direetion of 
the ehange. 
• The reversion oeeurs between if. =.O18 and if. =.020. 
b The reversion oeeurs between aT=2 and aT=2.5. 
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TABLE A2: SOCIAL WELFARE 
• «r. ~ a¿ aN aT ao 
E(VNU ) t ~ t t - -
E(VNR ) - - - t - -
E(VNU·VNR ) t ~ t ~ - -
E(VTU) ~ t t - t -
E(VTR) ~ t t - t -
E(VTR-VTU ) t ~ t - ~ -
E(VQu) ~ ~ ~ - - t 
E(VQR ) ~ ~ ~ - - t 
E(VQR-VQU ) t ~ t - - ~ 
E(VKU ) - - - - - -
E(VKR) - - - - - -
E(VKU-VKR ) - - - - - -
SWu ~ ~ ~ t t t 
SWR ~ ~ ~ t t t 
SWU-SWR t t t P t / ~ b,c t d 
Table A2 shows whether an agent's (or society's) welfare (row) increases (t) or decreases (~) as a result 
of an increase in a given parameter (column). More than one arrow in a box indicates a reversion in the direction 
of the change. 
a ITR turos froro harrnful to beneficial between aN=2 and aN=2.5. 
b The reversion occurs between aT=5.5 and aT=6. 
e ITR turos froro beneficial to harrnful between aT= 1.5 and aT= 2. 
d ITR turos froro beneficial to harrnful between ao= 1.5 and ao=2. 
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